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This case report provides an update and overview of litigation arising between Canada
and the United States in a series of cases referred to here as Lumber IV.1 The litigation
began in August 2001 in response to certain determinations of the U.S. Department of
Commerce (DOC) and International Trade Commission (ITC) and follows disputes
known informally as Lumber I (October 1982 - May 1983), Lumber II (May 1986 October 1986) and Lumber III (September 1991 – August 1994).2 All have dealt with the
price at which certain types of Canadian softwood lumber are sold in the U.S..
Lumber IV is made particularly complex by the range of proceedings undertaken. The
Government of Canada challenged different aspects of the DOC’s determinations under
the WTO Agreement and NAFTA Ch. 19, Canadian lumber producers challenged the
U.S. decision not to refund anti-dumping duties as a violation of NAFTA Ch. 11, and
both the Government of Canada and the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports3, part of the
U.S. lumber lobby, engaged in follow-up litigation before U.S. courts. The multiplicity of
challenges has spawned confusion as to what Lumber IV involves. An additional
complicating factor is a proposed settlement announced between the Governments of the
U.S. and Canada on April 28, 2006.4
Key to understanding the Canadian claims in Lumber IV is the requirement in
international law that U.S. agencies do certain things when allegations of dumping or
subsidization are made. Dumping is the practice of selling goods in a foreign market at
less than fair value. Subsidization is the bestowal of a benefit by a government on

The title “Lumber IV” is used here to refer to the cases mentioned at the beginning of this case report and corresponds with the
appellation popularly used in the media: see for instance Marzena Czarnecka, Softwood Lumber: the War without End? LEXPERT 59
(February 2006). It does not correspond with the informal appellation given to certain individual softwood lumber cases in the WTO.
2
In 1982 the U.S. Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports filed a petition with the DOC alleging that certain provincial and
federal programs related to Canada’s forestry sector constituted countervailable subsidies. The investigation resulted in a negative
finding: Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24159 (May 31, 1983) (Lumber I). The investigation found that
stumpage rights were not provided to a “specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries” within the meaning of 19
U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(ii) and that stumpage did not constitute the “provision of goods or services at preferential rates.” 19 U.S.C. §
1677(5). In another petition filed by the Coalition in 1986, the DOC reversed its previous position and issued a preliminary affirmative
determination that certain provincial stumpage systems constituted countervailable subsidies: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37453 (1986) (Lumber II). The change in position resulted both from a new factual record and a revised
interpretation of U.S. law. Lumber II ended when Canada and the United States entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
in December, 1986. Pursuant to the MOU, Canada agreed to collect a charge on exports of softwood lumber to the U.S. in an amount
which was about equal to that which had been calculated in the Preliminary Determination. Under the terms of the MOU the tax could
be reduced or eliminated for provinces that instituted “replacement measures”, e.g., increases in the amount of stumpage fees, or other
charges. As a consequence, export charges for British Columbia and Québec were, in time, reduced or substantially eliminated.
Certain Atlantic provinces were also eventually exempted. Canada then elected to terminate the MOU in September, 1991. The DOC
self-initiated a third investigation in October 1991. The result of this investigation in May 1992 was an affirmative subsidy
determination which found that provincial stumpage programs and log export restraints in British Columbia conferred countervailable
subsidies: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22570 (May 28, 1992) (Lumber III). This determination
was appealed to a binational panel under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. The panel concluded that the DOC’s
determination that the export restraints were “specific” was unsupported by substantial evidence. The panel remanded to the DOC on
this and other issues: Softwood Lumber from Canada: Panel Decision, USA-92-1904-01 (May 6, 1993). On remand the DOC again
found a countervailable subsidy, and once more upon review the FTA panel held that the DOC had inadequately addressed certain
issues, including specificity: Softwood Lumber from Canada: Panel Decision on Remand, USA-92-1904-01 (Dec. 17, 1993). The
panel ordered Commerce to rescind the countervailing duty order, which it did on January 6, 1994: Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada, 59 Fed. Reg. 12584 (March 17, 1994). Later, negotiations between the Governments of Canada and the United
States resulted in the Softwood Lumber Agreement of August 1995.
3
The Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports Executive Committee is comprised of Hood Industries, International Paper Co., Moose River
Lumber Co., New South, Inc., Plum Creek Timber Co., Potlatch Corp., Seneca Sawmill Co., Shearer Lumber Products, Shuqualak
Lumber Co., Sierra Pacific Industries, Swift Lumber, Inc., Temple-Inland Forest Products, and Tolleson Lumber Co., Inc..
4
Text of U.S.-Canada Lumber Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (April 28, 2006).
1

3
producers of goods sold in a foreign market.5 Treaties ratified by the U.S. require
domestic agencies to make three determinations prior to the levying of antidumping or
countervailing duties in response. These are findings of:
1) dumping, subsidization, or the threat of either;
2) material injury to a domestic industry or the threat thereof, and
3) a causal link between the activity and the injury.6
In the U.S., findings of dumping and/or subsidization are made by the DOC. Findings of
material injury and causation are made by the ITC.7
****
Canada and the U.S. continue to have the largest bilateral trading relationship in the
world. In 2003 their two-way trade amounted to $441.5 billion, some 1.7 percent of
which – or $7.5 billion worth - was made up of Canadian exports of softwood lumber to
the U.S.. The wood is exported for a variety of commercial and construction-related
purposes. Softwood grows in a number of Canadian provinces on tracts of federally and
provincially-owned property known as “Crown Lands”. Canadian forest producers pay
for the right to harvest trees from this land. The fee is commonly referred to as
“stumpage”.
Canadian forestry arrangements differ significantly from those in United States, where
most lumber is harvested from trees on private land. The amount of stumpage that
Canadian lumber producers pay has been a butt of contention in virtually all of the
softwood lumber litigation. American lumber interests assert that the effective rate of
stumpage is below market value and therefore constitutes a subsidy. They also maintain
that lax reforestation and other ancillary obligations contribute to subsidization, and that
in addition, individual Canadian lumber producers price their product so as to dump
softwood lumber in the American market.
In May 1996 the governments of Canada and the United States concluded the Softwood
Lumber Agreement (SLA) to settle litigation arising in Lumber III.8 Under the SLA the
Government of Canada undertook to effectively limit the export of Canadian softwood
lumber to the United States to 14.7 billion board feet a year. It implemented the
5

Article 1.1 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures mandates that a subsidy is deemed to exist where
there is a financial contribution by a government, or there is any form of income or price support, and a benefit is thereby conferred. In
order to be actionable under the SCM Agreement, the subsidy must also meet the requisite degree of specificity under Art. 2.
6
The relevant provisions in U.S. law are 19 U.S.C. §1671 (subsidization), 19 U.S.C. §1673 (dumping) and 19 U.S.C.
§1671(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) and §1673(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (material injury).
7
In United States - Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber in Canada, WT/DS277/R, para. 7.2
(March 22, 2004) the panel described the agencies’ schedules as follows: “[The] USITC conducts its investigation in every case on a
timetable which is separate from but overlaps the time table for USDOC's investigation of dumping and subsidization. Moreover,
USITC and USDOC both conduct their investigations in two phases, preliminary and final. The preliminary phase of the injury
investigation begins on the day an application for anti-dumping or countervailing duty measures is filed, and is completed before the
preliminary determination of dumping and/or subsidization is made by USDOC. The final phase of USITC's injury investigation
usually is begun after USDOC's preliminary determination and overlaps the issuance of USDOC's final determination of dumping
and/or subsidization. If USDOC's final determination is affirmative, USITC completes the final phase of its investigation and issues a
final determination.”
8
Softwood Lumber Agreement Between the United States of America and the Government of Canada, 35 I.L.M. P.R. List 1 47 (Vol. 2,
Ex. 3) (May 29, 1996).
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obligation by establishing a quota system among historic exporters and charging an
export duty on softwood lumber. For its part, the U.S. government terminated all actions
brought by the American lumber industry in U.S. courts.
The expiration of the SLA on March 31, 2001 brought this modus vivendi to an end.
Canadian lumber producers were free to export softwood lumber to the U.S. without
limit, something which led the Coalition to deposit an immediate countervailing duty
petition on April 2, 2001. On May 23, 2001 the ITC published a preliminary affirmative
determination which concluded that there was reasonable indication that the U.S. industry
was threatened with material injury. Subsequently, on August 17, 2001, the DOC
imposed a preliminary countervailing duty of 19.31 percent on softwood lumber imports
from Canada.9
Canada then challenged the DOC’s preliminary determination under the WTO
Agreement. In U.S. – Preliminary Determinations with respect to Certain Softwood
Lumber from Canada10 the panel held that the Canadian provincial stumpage programs
were a “financial contribution”, but concluded that the DOC had incorrectly assessed
whether stumpage conferred a “benefit” by using U.S. market conditions as a benchmark
instead of Canadian ones.11 The panel also held that the DOC had wrongly presumed that
any alleged benefit from harvesting timber due to stumpage rates is automatically “passed
through” from timber producers to downstream producers of softwood lumber.12 The
panel further held that under the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement the DOC had
impermissibly applied provisional measures since any such measure could only be
applied pursuant to a final determination.13
While United States – Preliminary Determinations was being argued and decided, several
important developments took place. On October 30, 2001 the DOC issued a preliminary
anti-dumping determination against six major Canadian softwood lumber producers, and
following a process of verification, issued a final anti-dumping determination on April 2,
2002. On May 16, 2002 the ITC also completed its investigation into material injury. It
concluded that while Canadian softwood lumber imports had not been shown to cause
present material injury, they posed a threat of material injury to the U.S. industry. The
result of these two determinations was a final countervailing duty rate of 18.79% and an
average final anti-dumping duty rate of 8.43%, for a combined average total rate of
27.22%.14

9

66 Fed. Reg 43186 (Aug. 17, 2001).
WT/DS236/R (Sept. 27, 2002).
The panel found that the DOC failed to determine the existence and amount of benefit to producers on the basis of prevailing market
conditions in Canada, as required by SCM Agreement Arts 1.1 (b), 14 and 14(d).
12
“We find that in such circumstances, where a downstream producer of subject merchandise is unrelated to the allegedly subsidized
upstream producer of the input, an authority is not allowed to simply assume that a benefit has passed through. … The fact that in the
large majority of cases the lumber producers and the harvesters are related, does not imply that it is no longer necessary in cases where
there is no such relationship to examine and determine whether a benefit existed for the independent producers of the subject
merchandise including independent re-manufacturers.” United States – Preliminary Determinations, WT/DS236/R, para. 7.74 (Sept.
27, 2002).
13
See United States – Preliminary Determinations, WT/DS236/R, paras 7.93 and 7.104 (Sept. 27, 2002).
14
67 Fed. Reg. 36069 (May 22, 2002). The final anti-dumping rates established were: Abitibi-Consolidated (12.44%), Canfor
(5.96%), Slocan (7.71%), Tembec (10.21%), West Fraser (2.18%), Weyerhauser (12.39%) and an all others rate (8.43%).
10
11
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The U.S. determinations had an impact on the Canadian industry. Some smaller mills and
related businesses were forced to shut, but larger Canadian-based companies took the
opportunity to become leaner, more nimble players and began to turn their attention
towards newer markets such as China.15 Overall, Canadian exports of softwood lumber
remained at about one-third of U.S. domestic consumption.
Canada then challenged the U.S. final determinations under both the WTO Agreement
and NAFTA. The following summarizes the course of litigation.
In United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to Certain
Softwood Lumber from Canada16 the Appellate Body held that harvesting rights granted
by Canadian provincial governments could constitute a “provision of goods” in terms of
the “financial contribution” element of a subsidy. However, the Appellate Body also
found itself unable to complete the legal analysis concerning the “benefit” bestowed
because of insufficient factual findings concerning benchmark prices by the panel.17 It
agreed, nevertheless, that the DOC had acted inconsistently with both the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and GATT 1994 by failing
to analyze whether subsidies were passed through in sales of timber to unrelated
producers of softwood lumber.18
To comply with the WTO’s recommendation, the DOC subsequently performed a passthrough analysis in respect of certain transactions.19 However, the new rate of
subsidization was calculated to be no different from the old one. Consequently, Canada
challenged the consistency of the compliance measures. A compliance panel under Art.
21.5 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) found continuing failure to
conduct pass through methodology with respect to certain sawmill-to-sawmill sales of
timber as well as associated calculating errors, and therefore that the U.S. remained
inconsistent with obligations in SCM Agreement and GATT 1994.20 These findings were
upheld by the Appellate Body.21
“In a poll of its members in June 2003, the Canadian Federation of Independent Business found that 33% of [British Columbia’s]
small businesses felt their business was significantly harmed by the lumber dispute and a further 37% were slightly harmed.” British
Columbia Ministry of Management Services, SMALL BUSINESS QUARTERLY 2-3 (3rd Quarter 2004). The Report also noted that “[i]n
an effort to remain profitable despite the imposition of the punishing duties, larger firms attempted to rationalize their operations by
shutting down inefficient mills and ramping up production at other mills to gain efficiencies and benefit from economies of scale. …
While this was a successful strategy for some of the larger lumber companies in the province, it was not an option available to many
small business operations with only one small mill and a limited amount of wood supply. Many of these smaller operations simply
could not operate with a duty of that magnitude and were forced to shut their doors.” Ibid.
16
WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004).
17
“[T]here are insufficient factual findings by the Panel and undisputed facts in the Panel record to enable us to examine whether the
benchmark used by USDOC in the underlying investigation related or referred to, or was connected with, prevailing market conditions
in Canada, as required by Article 14(d), so as to adequately reflect price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other
conditions of purchase or sale. Consequently, we are unable to complete the legal analysis …” U.S. – Final Countervailing Duty
Determination, WT/DS/AB/R, para. 118 (Jan. 19, 2004).
18
“Where the input producers and producers of the processed products operate at arm's length, the pass-through of input subsidy
benefits from the direct recipients to the indirect recipients downstream cannot simply be presumed; it must be established by the
investigating authority. In the absence of such analysis, it cannot be shown that the essential elements of the subsidy definition in
Article 1 are present in respect of the processed product.” U.S. – Final Countervailing Duty Determination, WT/DS/AB/R, para. 143
(Jan. 19, 2004).
19
Notice of Implementation Under Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act; Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 69 FED. REG. 75305 (Dec. 16, 2004).
20
A U.S. argument before the compliance panel was that the Appellate Body’s original decision only required pass-through analysis
with respect to transactions between tenured timber harvester/sawmills and unrelated, non-tenure holding sawmills. The compliance
panel disagreed, holding that the U.S. had not complied because it had failed to conduct a pass-through analysis in respect of sales,
found by [the] USDOC not to be at arm's length, of logs by tenured timber harvesters, whether or not they also produce lumber, to
15

6

In United States – Final Dumping Determination of Softwood Lumber from Canada22 the
Appellate Body upheld a finding that the DOC had acted inconsistently with the WTO
Anti-dumping Agreement by calculating anti-dumping margins on the basis of a
weighted average comparison employing a “zeroing” methodology. Zeroing means that
in an anti-dumping investigation some export prices for certain transactions are treated as
if they were less than what they actually are, thereby potentially depressing the average
export price and increasing the rate of dumping.
To comply with the WTO’s recommendation, the DOC subsequently calculated new rates
for Canadian exporters by employing a “transaction-to-transaction” methodology.23 The
DOC summed up amounts by which, on individual transactions, the export price was less
than the normal value, but did not include amounts by which the export price exceeded
the normal value. Canada then challenged the WTO consistency of this method. The
compliance panel found that in the absence of any further definition of the phrase
“margins of dumping” in the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, and in the absence of any
requirement in “T-T” methodology to ensure that all comparable export transactions are
represented in the weighted average export price, there was no obligation to establish a
dumping margin by offsetting non-dumped amounts against dumped amounts.24 This
conclusion was appealed by Canada and had not been completed at the time that the
settlement in Lumber IV was first announced.
In United States – Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood
Lumber from Canada25 a WTO panel found the ITC’s determination concerning the
potential threat of injury to be unfounded for lack of evidence.26
To comply with the panel’s decision the ITC issued a revised threat of injury
determination on November 16, 2004 which elaborated upon, but did not change, the
original analysis.27 Canada subsequently sought compliance review of the ITC
unrelated lumber producers, whether or not they also held tenure rights. The panel also faulted the DOC for including in its subsidy
numerator transactions for which it had not demonstrated that the benefit of subsidized log inputs had passed through to the processed
product. See WT/DS257/RW, para. 4.73, 4.82, 4.103 (Aug. 1, 2005).
21
WT/DS257/AB/RW, para. 96 (Dec. 5, 2005).
22
WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 2004).
23
Notice of Determination Under Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Antidumping Measures on Certain Softwood
Lumber Products From Canada, 70 FED. REG. 22636 (May 2, 2005). Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement states that “the
existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison of a
weighted average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal
value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis.”
24
“In our view, this would be a permissible interpretation of the relevant part of the first sentence of Article 2.4.2, even though it does
not reflect the full results of all comparisons. In other words, when establishing the amount of dumping for the purpose of calculating
a margin of dumping under the T-T comparison methodology, an investigating authority need not include in its calculations the results
of comparisons where export price exceeds normal value.” United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from
Canada – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, WT/DS264/RW, para. 5.28 (April 3, 2006).
25
WT/DS277/R (March 22, 2004).
26
“It is clear to us that the fundamental basis of the USITC's affirmative threat determination is the conclusion that dumped and
subsidized imports from Canada would increase substantially. However, looking at the evidence relied on by the United States in
support of the determination, we cannot accept that this conclusion is one that could be reached by an objective and unbiased decision
maker. It seems to us that, at most, the evidence relied upon by the USITC could support a conclusion that imports of softwood
lumber would continue at the historical levels, and might increase somewhat, in keeping with increased demand, and consistent with
historical patterns. But we can find no rational explanation in the USITC's determination, based on the evidence cited, for the
conclusion that there would be a substantial increase in imports imminently.” WT/DS277/R, para. 7.89 (March 22, 2004)
27
See Section 129Consistency Determination: Views of the Commission, Inv. 701-TA-414 and 731-TA-938 (Nov. 24, 2004) available
at http://www.usitc.gov/fopin.129.pdf. A majority of the ITC understood its task on redetermination as follows: “the Commission
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redetermination. The compliance panel upheld the redetermination. Its opinion stressed
the need for deference to domestic agency decision-making.28 That conclusion was later
overturned by the Appellate Body, which asserted that the compliance panel had
articulated and applied an improper standard of review.29 Nevertheless, due to the
presence of considerable contested evidence, the Appellate Body declined to complete
the analysis. Thus, while it reversed the panel’s conclusion that the U.S. had brought
itself into conformity with the WTO Agreement, it was unable to make a
recommendation concerning any further action that the U.S. should take.
Canada also mounted similar challenges under NAFTA Ch. 19.
In Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Department of Commerce Final
Affirmative CVD and Final Negative Critical Circumstances Determination)30 the
binational panel reviewed a challenge to the DOC’s final countervailing duty rate.31 The
issues were ones already seen in the context of WTO challenges involving subsidization:
“financial contribution” and “benefit”. The panel agreed that the DOC had proven
financial contribution and benefit based on U.S. benchmarks. Although it expressed some
skepticism about the choice of benchmark, under the applicable standard of review it
upheld the DOC’s determination.
Subsequently, in a remarkable series of five remands, the panel determined that while the
DOC’s approach was not unreasonable, the calculations were not supported by the
evidence. It therefore directed the DOC to undertake certain revisions and other action
which caused the recalculated rate to fall. Following the panel’s fifth and final remand to
the DOC on March 17, 2006, the subsidy rate was recalculated to be 0.8%, an amount
which under U.S. law is considered de minimus and therefore not a subsidy. This
outcome was the subject of an Extraordinary Challenge by the U.S. which has been
suspended pending the outcome of final settlement negotiations between the two
governments.32
understands that the WTO wants the Commission to provide more explanation and reasoning for its decision.” However, it also
reopened the record and collected more information and evidence. Ibid, pp. 5-6.
28
WT/DS277/RW (Nov. 15, 2005).
29
“First, the Panel's repeated reliance on the test that Canada had not demonstrated that an objective and unbiased authority "could
not" have reached the conclusion that the USITC did, is at odds with the standard of review that has been articulated by the Appellate
Body in previous reports. As we noted earlier, the standard applied by the Panel imposes an undue burden on the complaining party.
Secondly, the "not unreasonable" standard employed by the Panel at various reprises is also inconsistent with the standard of review
that has been articulated by the Appellate Body in previous reports, and it is even more so for ultimate findings as opposed to
intermediate inferences made from particular pieces of evidence. Thirdly, the Panel did not conduct a critical and searching analysis
of the USITC's findings in order to test whether they were properly supported by evidence on the record and were "reasoned and
adequate" in the light of alternative explanations of that evidence.” WT/DS277/AB/RW, para. 138 (April 13, 2006).
30
USA-CDA-2002-1904-03 (decisions rendered August 13, 2003, June 7, 2004, December 1, 2004, May 23, 2005, October 5, 2005
and March 17, 2006).
31
Notice of Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Critical Circumstances Determination: Certain
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 15455 (April 2, 2002), amended 67 Fed. Reg. 36070 (May 22, 2002). On
August 2, 2001 Commerce amended the Notice of Initiation to exempt certain softwood lumber products harvested and produced in
the provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland from investigation in the countervail case
only. The reasons given for the exclusion were that the Atlantic provinces substantially increase their stumpage fees from Crown land
at a level substantially above the appraised values, and that 60% of their timber is privately owned.
32
Under NAFTA Art. 1904.13 binational panel decisions may be subject to Extraordinary Challenge where there are allegations that a
panel member is guilty of misconduct, the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, or the panel manifestly
exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction. The Extraordinary Challenge in Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada
(Department of Commerce Final Affirmative CVD and Final Negative Critical Circumstances Determination) was launched April 27,
2006 but was immediately suspended under the terms of a proposed settlement between the U.S. and Canada over the Lumber IV
dispute. See U.S.-Canada Lumber Deal Hinges on Canadian Mills Dropping Litigation, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (April 28, 2006).
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In Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Department of Commerce Final
Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value)33 a number of the Canadian companies
subject to anti-dumping duties on softwood lumber challenged the DOC’s anti-dumping
determination. The original determination was remanded to the DOC twice on a number
of points having to do mainly with explanations sustaining the DOC’s reasoning and
certain adjustments. In the third remand of June 9, 2005 the panel directed the elimination
of anti-dumping duties for one Canadian producer (West Fraser) and a recalculation of
anti-dumping rates for all other subject companies. In particular, the panel sought DOC
compliance with the Appellate Body’s decision in United States – Final Dumping
Determination of Softwood Lumber from Canada, seen above. The panel considered
whether the Charming Betsy doctrine and the informal nature of zeroing – an
administrative practice conducted without statutory basis under U.S. law – could lead to
retrospective effect for the WTO decision in the NAFTA challenge. The panel ultimately
concluded that they could, principally because the WTO decision involved action
concerning the same anti-dumping investigation. The panel therefore directed the DOC to
apply non-zeroing methodology, observing that “[o]ur decision does not purport to
change U.S. antidumping law; rather it applies U.S. antidumping law (as appropriately
interpreted through Charming Betsy) to agency action.”34
A third NAFTA challenge by Canada, Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada
(Final Affirmative Threat of Injury Determination)35, dealt with the ITC’s threat of injury
determination. The principal basis of the challenge was the lack of evidence. In its first
remand order of September 5, 2003 the panel directed the ITC to analyze several new
analytical approaches. In its second remand of April 19, 2004 the panel directed the ITC
to conduct the threat of injury analysis consistent with a number of conclusions that
obviated key parts of the ITC’s original findings. The panel’s third remand of August 31,
2004 was more pointed still. Noting that the ITC relied on the same record that the panel
had twice found insufficient, the panel took the view that the ITC’s behaviour amounted
to an unwillingness “to accept the Panel’s review authority”, something which “obviates
the impartiality of the decision-making process” and “severely undermines the entire
Chapter 19 panel review process.”36 Noting too that further remands would be an “idle
and useless formality”, the panel concluded that there was little record evidence to sustain
an affirmative threat determination and “explicitly instruct[ed] the [ITC] to make a
determination consistent with the determination of this Panel” within 10 days. 37 The
panel’s decision was subject to an Extraordinary Challenge by the U.S., later dismissed
on August 10, 2005.38
****

33

USA-CDA-2002-1904-02 (decisions rendered July 17, 2003, March 5, 2004 and June 9, 2005).
USA-CDA-2002-1904-02, Decision of the Panel on the Third Remand, p. 42 (June 9, 2005).
USA-CDA-2002-1904-07 (decisions rendered September 5, 2003, April 19, 2004 and August 31, 2004).
36
USA-CDA-2002-1904-07, Second Remand Decision of the Panel, p. 3 (August 31, 2004).
37
USA-CDA-2002-1904-07, Second Remand Decision of the Panel, p. 7 (August 31, 2004).
38
ECC-2004-1904-01USA.
34
35
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The U.S.’s decision to retain duties paid by Canadian softwood lumber producers was
also challenged under the investor-state mechanism of NAFTA Ch. 11. Canfor
Corporation filed a notice of arbitration on July 11, 2002 and was followed by similar
claims made by Terminal Forest Products and Tembec. All of the companies are
Canadian forest products producers and all alleged breaches of NAFTA due to the ITC
and DOC determinations seen above. The cases asserted violations of NAFTA Art. 1102
(national treatment), Art. 1103 (Most Favoured Nation treatment), Art. 1105 (the
minimum standard of treatment) and Art. 1110 (expropriation). On September 7, 2005 a
panel of arbitrators agreed to a U.S. request to consolidate the proceedings. The
consolidated case apparently continues and is not referred to in the government-togovernment settlement.
****
Lumber IV has also been accompanied by follow-up litigation in U.S. courts. In the first
case, launched on August 25, 2005 in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), the
Government of Canada disputed the contention that application of s. 129 of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act (URAA) by the DOC in United States – Investigation of the
International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada was proper.39
Specifically, Canada argued that s. 129(a)(6) only empowers the USTR to direct
revocation of an existing anti-dumping or countervailing duty order following a negative
determination by the ITC, not to submit a new one in its place. The litigation was
prompted by ITC action to comply with the Appellate Body’s finding concerning the
threat of injury, which the ITC had attempted to remedy by reopening the record and
elaborating upon, but not changing, the original analysis.40 Canada also challenged
distributions of countervailing duties collected from Canadian entities under the Byrd
Amendment, asserting that this was in violation of NAFTA 1902.2.41 In a decision of
early April 2006 the CIT substantially agreed with the Canadian position on both points
and ordered the parties to meet to discuss a possible remedy.42
In the second case, launched September 13, 2005 in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, the Coalition sought a declaration that the NAFTA Ch. 19
39

Tembec, the Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance, and the Government of Canada v. United States of America and the Coalition for
Fair Lumber Imports Executive Committee, Consol. Ct. No. 05-00028.
40
See Section 129Consistency Determination: Views of the Commission, Inv. 701-TA-414 and 731-TA-938 (Nov. 24, 2004) available
at http://www.usitc.gov/fopin.129.pdf.
41
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. §1675c (also known as “the Byrd Amendment”) came into
effect in October 2000. It provided that duties assessed pursuant to a countervailing duty order, an anti-dumping duty order, or a
finding under the Antidumping Act of 1921 were to be distributed on an annual basis to “affected domestic producers” for “qualifying
expenditures”. In January 2003 the law was found to violate the WTO Agreement and suspension of concessions by several countries
was authorized in November 2004. The law was partly repealed by Congress in December 2005, with full repeal scheduled in October
2007. NAFTA Art. 1902.2 requires that changes to domestic antidumping and countervailing duty laws by NAFTA countries may
only be applied to goods from other NAFTA countries provided that the amending statute expressly so specifies. The Byrd
Amendment did not refer to either Canadian or Mexican goods and therefore pursuant to U.S. implementing legislation could not be
applied to Canadian or Mexican products.
42
See U.S. Court Rules Byrd Law Cannot be Applied to Canadian Imports, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (April 14, 2006). An additional aspect
of the decision was the judge’s conclusion on Canada’s standing. Canada had argued that NAFTA was a contract and that the U.S. had
breached the contract by applying the Byrd Amendment to Canadian imports. Given Canada’s status as a party to NAFTA it was
entitled to sue. Pogue J. ruled against Canada because he said it had already found a remedy for the problem by pursuing and winning
a claim in the WTO that the Byrd Amendment violated WTO rules. He also noted that Canada had retaliated against the U.S. in the
case after receiving WTO authorization. The judge ruled that Canadian sawmills did have standing because they would likely suffer
injury as a result of redistributions under the Byrd Amendment.
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binational panel system was unconstitutional and violated the due process rights of the
principal group of American lumber producers.43 The case was later suspended as part of
a general settlement of the Lumber IV dispute.
****
On April 28, 2006 the Governments of Canada and the United States announced the basic
terms by which they will draft a proposed Agreement resolving Lumber IV.44 The
proposal requires the U.S. to revoke anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Canadian
softwood lumber imports. When the final Agreement is concluded it is estimated that the
U.S. will hold at least $5 billion in duty deposits. The U.S. is to receive $1 billion. The
remainder is to be distributed to the importers of record. The amount going to the U.S.
will be divided as follows: 50% to members of the Coalition, a portion for a joint
initiative benefiting the North American lumber market, and the remainder going to
initiatives in the U.S. as identified by the U.S. government in consultation with Canada.
The Agreement requires Canada to establish a scheme of border measures for the export
of Canadian softwood lumber to the U.S.. This is to be composed of export measures,
third-country triggers, and a surge mechanism, with the particular choice of export
measure – either an export charge or an export charge plus volume restraint – left to the
individual Canadian provinces.45 Canada, the provincial governments and the U.S. are to
make best efforts to define “policy exits” from the export measures within 18 months of
the new Agreement entering into force. The Agreement is to run for a term of 7 years,
with the possibility of a two-year renewal.
The basic terms of the settlement announced in late April 2006 were to be followed by
detailed negotiations over a final agreement. Industry sources said the talks could be
complex and controversial since a number of outstanding issues remain, including a
dispute settlement mechanism to resolve disagreements over the deal and an anticircumvention clause intended to prevent Canadian provinces from taking actions that
would offset the projected export tax.46 On the American side, recipients would also have
to agree how to apportion the $500 million in proceeds which, in light of the CIT’s
finding on the Canadian exemption from the Byrd Amendment, would have to be handled
under the U.S. federal government’s settlement authority.47
One lingering question is how to bring all of the associated litigation to an end. The U.S.
has made clear that all litigation must terminate for a final deal to go forward. The
Canadian government has moved to cut-off an aid package designed to assist Canadian

The challenge covered the first three articles of the U.S. Constitution as well as the Coalition’s due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment. It contested the decision in Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (USITC Final Injury Determination), USACDA-2002-1904-07. See Lumber Coalition Files NAFTA Chapter 19 Constitutional Challenge, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Sept. 16, 2005).
44
See supra, note 3.
45
Logs harvested from Canada’s Atlantic provinces, from the Yukon, Northwest Territories or Nunavut, will remain generally exempt
from border measures, but exports from the Atlantic provinces to the U.S. exceeding 100% of production in any quarter will be subject
to a penalty on the excess.
46
Distribution of Duties Still Big Obstacle to U.S.-Canada Lumber Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (May 5, 2006).
47
Ibid.
43
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forest producers in Lumber IV.48 It has also suggested to forest producers engaged in
investor-state litigation under NAFTA that it may seek to suspend Ch. 11 between itself
and the U.S. for the purposes of the Lumber IV-related claims by invoking Art. 58 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.49 One case that may continue is litigation
associated with Canadian challenges to the Byrd Amendment in the CIT, since the
dispute also involves duties paid by Canadian producers of wheat, steel and magnesium.50
Reaction to the proposed settlement has been mixed. The settlement is WTO-inconsistent
in the sense that it will impose restrictions on imports of Canadian softwood lumber in
violation of free trade commitments,51 but much has been made of the fact that at current
prices Canadian softwood lumber would face no tax or volume restrictions and that, in
any event, settlement is the price of peace.52
****
It is easy to be intimidated – if not a little confused – by all that has taken place in
Lumber IV. What needs to be kept in mind, however, is that while the two treaties are
substantively similar, their cores are fundamentally distinct. The WTO Agreement creates
a body of international law while NAFTA Ch. 19 refers back to a country’s own
domestic law. The differences can be profound. These are further accentuated by small,
but cumulatively significant, distinctions in the treatment of evidence, the standard of
review, and evolving self-understandings of what panels under each treaty are supposed
to do.
Under the WTO Agreement panels are to make “an objective assessment of the matter”, a
standard which has been held to lie somewhere between deference and de novo review.53
In addition, in cases under the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, panels are required to
sustain factual findings and interpretations of domestic agencies so long as these are
properly established, even though the panel itself might have decided differently. 54 The
“Industry sources said the federal Canadian government had threatened to withhold support from the industry if it did not endorse
the agreement …. The threats include promises to cancel a loan program proposed by the previous Canadian government that would
help mills continue litigation with the U.S. while dealing with losses related to the duties they paid on exports since 2002, sources
said. However, Canadian Ambassador to the U.S. Michael Wilson said Canada had pledged to move forward with this program if the
two sides were unable to reach a final deal.” U.S. Canada Lumber Deal Hinges on Canadian Mills Dropping Litigation, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (April 28, 2006).
49
Article 58.1(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) allows for the suspension
of a multilateral treaty by two parties to the treaty where the suspension is not prohibited, where it “does not affect the enjoyment by
the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations” and where it is not incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty. See Ontario Groups Sue U.S., Canada for Suspending NAFTA Lumber ECC, INSIDE U.S. TRADE
(May 19, 2006).
50
Distribution of Duties Still Big Obstacle to U.S.-Canada Lumber Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (May 5, 2006).
51
Article 11.1(b) of the WTO Safeguards Agreement states that “a [WTO] Member shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary
export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import side.” See also GATT Art.
XI. A long-standing decision holds that even quantitative restrictions having no trade impact violate GATT: EEC – Quantitative
Restrictions against Imports of Certain Products from Hong Kong, B.I.S.D. 30th Supp. 129 (1983).
52
“U.S. and Canadian officials noted that today’s lumber prices are about $370 per thousand board feet, which means if the deal were
in effect today, Canada could face no taxes or volume restrictions. The deal also includes a surge mechanism that would increase the a
Canadian region’s export taxes if its exports exceeded 110 percent of its recent export levels. However, if U.S. prices are above $355,
no export tax would be in place, and thus the surge mechanism would not discourage Canadian exports since there would be no tax in
place to increase.” U.S. Canada Lumber Deal Hinges on Canadian Mills Dropping Litigation, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (April 28, 2006).
53
“…the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor “total deference”, but rather the “objective assessment of the
facts”” European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R para. 117 (16 January
1998).
54
See Art. 17.6 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement.
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standards are opaque, and what is especially apparent in the WTO litigation in Lumber IV
is a real struggle by the panels to apply them conscientiously, if not always successfully.
Under NAFTA Ch. 19 by comparison, binational panels take the place of judicial review.
Panels are required to apply the same evidentiary standards and standards of review as
found in the domestic law, something which allows them to draw on the ready-made
store of law and doctrine developed by domestic courts. Application of the Charming
Betsy doctrine is a good example. At least one binational panel based much of its
reasoning on the idea that U.S. courts interpret U.S. law where at all possible as
consistent with international law and thereby directed the DOC to cease zeroing. Given
this background, it is clear that binational panels simply have more law to guide them.
The NAFTA Ch. 19 litigation in Lumber IV was also marked by the evolving selfunderstanding of what Ch. 19 panels are supposed to do. Under NAFTA there is little to
define what panels can do, or conversely, what national agencies must do in response.55
For this reason, panels have taken it upon themselves to fill the void assertively through
the use of a body of instructions. In several of the NAFTA challenges panels directed the
DOC and ITC to do certain things – for example to undertake certain lines of analysis –
that at the end of the day led to highly specific results.
The contrast with WTO proceedings could hardly be more stark. Under DSU Art. 19.1
WTO panels finding a violation must recommend that a country bring its law “into
conformity” with the WTO Agreement, a formula which is sufficiently vague that it can
mean many things. The imprecision can be exploited by a wily defendant, which is free
to engage in a shell-game of legal amendment aided by the fact that there is no formal
power of remand under the DSU. The generally inconclusive results in the WTO cases
speak for themselves.
One particularly interesting issue is the interplay between outcomes in both fora. The
cases reviewed the same administrative findings and therefore could be expected to raise
the danger of conflicting conclusions and issue estoppel. Some of this did in fact occur.56
Again, however, it is useful to recall that the two treaties involve distinct sets of rights
and obligations and that for the most part, while there were some mutual cross-reflections
in the litigation, the provocative question of legal conflict did not arise.
Even if it did, there is some difficulty in understanding how it would have affected
matters legally. In its recent decision in Mexico – Soft Drinks57 the Appellate Body
sidestepped the issue of potential conflict between the WTO Agreement and NAFTA by
treating it as a matter of jurisdiction. The Appellate Body expressed the view that a
NAFTA Art. 1904(8) states that “[t]he panel may uphold a final determination, or remand it for action not inconsistent with the
panel’s decision.” For further details on the interaction of binational panels with domestic agencies see Chi Carmody, Continental
Conversations: Remand of Binational Panel Decisions under NAFTA Ch. 19 in KEVIN KENNEDY (ed), THE FIRST DECADE OF
NAFTA: THE FUTURE OF FREE TRADE IN NORTH AMERICA 431-464 (2004).
56
See, for example, the assertion by the U.S. that Section 129Consistency Determination: Views of the Commission, Inv. 701-TA-414
and 731-TA-938 (Nov. 24, 2004) circumvented the panel’s decision in Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Final
Affirmative Threat of Injury Determination), USA-CDA-2002-1904-07, by providing for a new threat of injury determination. See
also Canadian Appeal of WTO Lumber Decision to Focus on Standard of Review, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Nov. 18, 2005).
57
WT/DS308/AB/R (March 6, 2006).
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decision to decline to adjudicate due to conflict would appear to diminish the right of a
country to seek redress under the treaty. At the same time the Appellate Body also
disclaimed “any basis in the DSU for panels and the Appellate Body to adjudicate nonWTO disputes.”58 Whether this is ultimately satisfying reasoning or not, the Appellate
Body appeared to regard the resolution of conflict as something to be dealt with
elsewhere. Its attitude contrasts with NAFTA decisions in High-Fructose Corn Syrup59
and Lumber IV where binational panels have been relatively receptive to WTO decisionmaking.
All of this seems to present a decidedly mixed picture of the outcome in Lumber IV. Still,
it is important to recall what was achieved. Both the countervailing and anti-dumping
duty rates were substantially lowered. A sustained effort was made to deal with zeroing.
Distribution of antidumping and countervailing duties to domestic interests under the
Byrd Amendment was held to violate international law. The U.S. and Canada might
appear to be back where they began, that is, with a politically brokered settlement, but the
litigation probably helped them get there. In that sense, Lumber IV is a useful reminder of
the limits of the law.
CHI CARMODY60
Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario

58

Ibid., para. 56.
MEX-USA-98-1904-01 (April 15, 2002).
60
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario and Canadian Director, Canada-United States Law Institute.
Email: ccarmody@uwo.ca. I would like to thank Janice Ho for her research assistance.
59

